A structural probit model is estimated to determine the change in the probability of selecting a milk handler. Cooperatives are thought to have lower prices and higher deductions than independent milk handlers and these Factors reduce the probability that a farmer will select a cooperative by 0.39 and 0.32. Cooperatives are thought to have better services and an assured market and payment than independent milk handlers and these factors increase the probability that a farmer will select a cooperative by 0.20 and 0.26. This indicates that many cooperative members value tnonetary charact eristlcs over non-monetary characteristics.
Milk marketing cooperatives provide mssny services for their members. These may include extensive on-farm field services, milk hauling, supply balancing, and providing an assured market for their member's milk. For some of these services, such as supply balancing, the cooperative members pay for the service while the independent dairy farmers may not. The value of belonging to a milk marketing cooperative has been estimated by Berry, et al, and Liebrand and Ling. Berry et al, found that the maximum difference between cooperative and non-cooperative milk handler prices without cooperatives losing members was about $0.20 per cwt. Liebrand and Ling found that farmers, who were satisfied or very satisfied with their cooperative and were receiving lower prices and knew it, were receiving about $0.57 per cwt less than non-cooperative members (p. I), A national survey of mdk marketers reported that security and market access were important attributes of cooperatives in that 95 percent of the cooperatives guaranteed a market for dairy farmers versus 51 percent of the proprietary processors (Schrader, et al) . Wilkins and Stafford found that the most important tlctors that dairy farmers indicated for selling milk to cooperatives or proprietary handlers were price received, hauling charges, deductions, assessments, and market amurance.
Hamlett and Roach found that an assured market was the primary reason for joining a coopemtlve (p, 1). Boynton and Babb found that a guat%dnteed market and payment for milk were the most imporkdnt functions to farmers selling to a cooperative (p, 9). However, no one has quantified these factors according to their impact, on the probability of a farmer selecting a cooperative or non-cooperative milk handler.
The objective of this paper is to quantifỹ he qualitative factors according to their impact on a dairy farmer's selection of a cooperative or noncooperative milk handler, Following Lee, a structural probit model is estimated to determine the change in the probability of selecting a handler based on the farmer's reasons for selecting their current milk handler. The Fdrmer's reasons include (a) pays highest price, (b) services are better, (c) friendly people, (d) other tlrmers recommend, (e) lowest deductions, and (f) an assured market,
The Model
A dai~farmer can bccomc a member of a dairy cooperative or remain an independent and sell directly to a processing or manufacturing plant. Each dairy farmer faces two milk prices, the cooperative price and the non-cooperative price. The choice of cooperative membership may not be without cost. For example, the mail box price may be lower if the farmer joins a cooperative; however, the farmer is assured or a market for his milk, while there is not an assured market for the milk of many non-cooperative members. With these and other factors, the individual farmer decides to become a cooperative member or not, With cooperative or non-cooperative status determined, the farmers' prices from selling milk are set according to the type of cooperative joined or proprietary handler chosen, Following Lee, let P,, and P,,, be the cooperative and non-cooperative milk prices for individual farmer i and p, the reservation price which summarizes his specific preferences. Individual farmer i is assumed to join the cooperative if the cooperative-non-coopemtive price differential exceeds his reservation price, i.e.,
(1) (P,, -Pn,yP,,, > p, The reservation price, p,, can be either positive or negative. In this article, it is mumed that p, is a function of the farm characteristics, the farmer's reasons for choosing their current mdk handler, and the location of the farm, i.e., The respective prices for cooperative members and non-cooperative members are where Cc,and eH,are random residuals which are assumed to be N(O, IS:) and iV(O,~~), respectively.
Data
A survey of southern dairy farmers was conducted in January and February of 1989 to evahmte dairy farmer opinions of their buyers (cooperatives and proprietary firms) and to determine reasons for changing or not changing buyers.
Agricultural economists from twelve southern states, the Economic Research Service and the Agricultural Cooperative Service participated in the study (Carley, et al.) . Data were obtained from a rdndom sample of dairy fhrmers in APdbama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolini, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia. The questionnaire was mailed to 5,660 dairy farmers in these states. Useable responses were obtained from 2,536 dairy Pirmers for a return rate of 44.8 percent. This represents approximately 25 percent of the total Grade A farmers in the twelve southern states. From the sample, 1,438 useable questionnaires were obtained from eleven states excluding Florida', The mail box price data are based on prices received by farmers during December 1988, The mail box price N defined as the gross price paid by handlers to farmers minus the cost of hauling milk from the farm to a plant, minus the national dairy board assessment, minus a state milk commission J Agn and Apphed Econ , December, 1994 445 fee, minus market service costs, minus cooperative capital retains, and minus miscellaneous deductions.
Inforrndtion on the milk price received by dairy farmers, farm characteristics (k), the farmer's reasons for choosing their current milk handler (r), and the location of the dairy farm (1) were collected in the survey (Table 1 ). The farmer's reasons for choosing their current milk handler were obrdined by asking "Why did you choose to sell your milk through your current cooperative or milk plant?". Farmers were asked to circle the applicable reasons for choosing their current milk handler.
Of the 1,438 farmers in this study, the most frequently mentioned reasons for choosing a mdk handler are (1) assured rndrkct and payment (57.6 percent), (2) services are better (36.6 percent), and (3) pays highest price (36,0 percent) (Table 1) , Of the 1438 farmers, 1,169 were cooperative members and 269 were not cooperative members. Cooperative members most frequently mentioned reasons are (1) assured market and payment (63.9 percent), (2) services are better (39.9 percent), (3) friendly people (29.2 percent), and (4) pays highest price (28.9 percent) ( Table 1) . Non-cooperative farmers most frequently mentioned reasons for choosing to sell directly to a processor arc (1) pays highest price (66.9 percent), (2) friendly people (37.9 percent), and (3) assured markel and payment (30.5 percent) (Table 1) .
Model Estimation
The dependent variable in the price equation (equation (5)) is the natural logarithm of the price to farmers and Log P,, -Log Pn, was used to approximate ((PC,-PnJ/P,l,) in equation (4) (Lee, p, 418) , The model can be rewritten as , +y2r, +y31, -y4 (log p,, -log p., 
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In this model, onc observes the exogenous variables, the cooperative status variable l:, and either the dependent variable P,, or P.,. The observed price depends on the farmer's status, i.e., one observes P,, when 1: = 1, and Pnl when 1: = O, but never both. Note that the price equations in (6) cannot in general be consistently estimated by ordinary least squares using the observed prices due to selectivity bias (Lee) . Substituting the price equations from equation (6) (i.e., equations representing Log P,, and Log P.,) into the cooperative status equation l; in (6), one has a typical probit model where k, is a vector of farm characteristics, r, is a vector of the farmer's reasons for choosing their current nulk handler, 1,is a vector of fttrm locations (Table 1) , Thus one can estimate the 0's by probit analysis and obtain consistent estimates after normalizing C& =1 (Lee; MaddaPd).
To correct for selectivity btids, the price equations in (6) can be written M (8) log PC,= 8, (, + i5c1kc, + 5,31,, -Q:f(vl) if'iv,)) + ml
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where v =0,, +t3, k,+02r, +021, ,Fis the cumulative distribution of a standard normal random variable and ,f is its density function, The parameters of the price eqwdtions can be estimated consistently by regressing the observed farmer prices (Log P's) on the k's, l's and ;j7F or.fl(l-fl as specified by equations (8) and (9) (Lee; Maddala) . (6) log Pc, = i3co+ S,l kc, + S,2 1,,+ e,, To obtain the structural parameters y of log P", = 6.,, +~til k,,, + dH21., + e., the cooperative status equation~in equation (6) Results milk marketing cooperative (regime one) and dairy farmers who were not (regime two) during the Two-stage parameter estimates and related survey period (Table 2) . statistics for the above model arc presented in Tables 2 through 3, The consistent two-s~age The results show that the selectivity bias estimates for the rndil-box price equations (estimated coefficient of (-/(v,)/F(yJ,)) in equation (equations (8) and (9)) are obtained by dividing the (8)) between the participation equation (equation sample into dairy farmers who were members of a (7)) and mad-box price equation for cooperative .,-
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dairy farmers (equation (8)) is insignificant at u=. 10 (Lambda in Table 2 ), However, the selection bias (estimated coefficient of~~)/(1-F'(~))) in equation (9)) between the participation equation (equation (7)) and mail-box price equation for non-cooperative dairy farmers (equation (9)) is significant at u = .10 level (Lambda in Table 2 ), which indicates the correction for it was necessary.
The coefficient estimate of the cow numbers variable for cooperative members (Table 2) indicates that larger operations tend to receive a higher price from their milk than smaller operators. This is not the case with a non-cooperative farmer (Table 2 ). In addition, results show that the net prices from bargaining cooperatives arc higher than the prices from a cooperative that also processes milk (the omitted variable). The mail box prices increase as expected as Class 1 utilization increases; however, Class 1 utilization is not significant in the cooperative equation, Furthermore, as deductions increase, mailbox price also increases. This indicates that higher deductions are associated with higher prices, This was not the case for noncooperative members although the coefficient is insignificant, Finally, the over-order premium coefficient is positive but insignificant.
The results also show, that the prices to dairy farmers are different from state to state. Prices to dairy Farmers in Arkansas, Kentucky and Tennessee are lower than the prices to dairy farmers in Louisiana, Mississippi and Texas. Alabama, Georgia, North Carolirm, and Virginia have prices that are not significantly different from Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas. Only South Carolina has mail box prices that are higher than Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas, These results are the same for both cooperative and noncooperative members,
Kilmer, Lee and Carle~, Factors ln~uencwg Farmers' Selectton of a Milk Handler
The second column of Table 3 shows the probit structural estimates for the decision equation I: (equation (6)). In general, the signs of the coefficient estimates are consistent with expectations, In addition, all but three coefficients are statistically significant.
Of the four farm characteristics, three are significant at the rx = 0.05 level and one at the a = 0.10 level, As the number of cows increase and as equity increases, the likelihood of the farmer becoming a cooperative member decreases (Table  3) , The likelihood of the farmer becoming a cooperative member increases as the number of years the farmer has been in dairy increases and as the percent of income from dairy increases (Table  3) . J Agr and Apphed Econ,, Decembec 1994 Of the six vanablcs representing a dairy farmer's reasons for choosing their current milk handler, five are significant at the a =0,05 level. Reasons concerning pays highest price, friendly people, and lowest deductions decreme the probability that farmers will choose to join a cooperative by 0.39, 0,08, and 0.32 ( Table 3 ). Variables that represent monetary att]tudes (i.e., pays highest price and lowest deductions) about a milk handler have the greatest impact on reducing the probability of a farmer choosing a cooperative milk handler.
Factors that positively influence a farmer's decision to join a cooperative include services are better and an assured market and payment for the farmer's milk. These factors increased the farmer's probability of choosing a cooperative by 0.20 and 0.26. Thus, monetary variables (pays highest price and lowest deductions) have a larger impact on the probability of joining a cooperative than nonmonetary variables (services are better and an assured market and payment).
Of the farm location variables, the probability of being m a cooperative was less likely if a farmer lives in Alabama and Arkansas rather than Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas, The probability is more likely if a farmer lives in Kentucky, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia rather than Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas. Farmers are equally likely of being in a cooperative if they live in Georgia and Tennessee as well as Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas, Finally, if the cooperative-non-cooperative price differential (Log P,, -Log Pn,) is positive (negative), the probability of a farmer selecting a cooperative increases (decreases) because the estimated coefficient is positive (92,622 )( Table 3) . The cooperative-non-cooperative price differential has a sample average that is negative (-0.039 with a standard deviation of 0.024) which indicates that References 449 the non-cooperative average price is higher than the coopemtive average price. Thus on average, the cooperative-non-cciopemtive price differential will decrease the probability for farmers to become cooperative members. Furthermore, a small change m the negative average price differential will cause a large change in the probability of selecting a milk hdndler (Table 3) ,
Summary and Conclusions
It is generally held that an assured market is the primary reason that dairy farmers switch to a milk marketing cooperative (Hamlett and Roach and F30ynton and 13abb) . Of the 1,438 farmers in this study, the most frequently mentioned reasons for choosing a milk handler are (1) assured market and payment (57.6 percent), (2) services are better (36.6 percent), and (3) pays highest price (36.0 percent). However, the monetary characteristics of a milk handler (e.g., pays highest price and lowest deductions) are more important in influencing Parmers to choose a cooperative milk handler than are the non-monetaty characteristics (e.g., services are better and assured market and payment). Cooperatives arc thought to have lower pnccs and higher deductions than independent milk handlers and these factors reduce the probability that a farmer will select a cooperative by 0.39 and 0.32. On the other hand, cooperatives are thought to have better services and an assured market and payment than mdepcndent milk handlers and these factors increase the probability that a farmer will select a cooperative by 0.20 and 0.26.
CooperMives must be concerned with milk price and deductions in order to attract and keep members. Services and an assured market and payment can offset low price to a certain extent; however, dollars pay the costs of operating a dairy farm. In order to compete in the market place, cooperatives must maintain a competitive price because monetary factors are more important to dairy farmers thdn non-monetary factors. 
